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Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended) 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES § 41-6-44 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1953 as amended) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended) 
APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Whether the officer's arrest of the Defendant was properly based on probable 
cause that the Defendant committed a crime. 
Issue 2. Whether the officer's alleged mistaken pronouncement at the time of arrest 
invalidates the arrest and taints any evidence seized as a result thereof. 
The standard for reviewing determinations of probable cause to arrest is two-fold. First, 
the lower court's factual findings will be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Second, 
the trial court's conclusions of law based on those facts are to be reviewed under a correctness 
standard, according no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. See State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229,1232 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
The issue was preserved pursuant to the Defendant's entering into a conditional plea 
agreement wherein the Defendant reserved the right to appeal the lower court's decision denying 
his motion to suppress. (Tr. at 112.) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Constitutional Provisions 
Statutes 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood 
alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state 
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(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed 
by the person. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended). 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES § 41-6-44. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may without 
warrant, arrest a person . . . (2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class 
A misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal appeal. The Defendant was charged by information with 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-44 
of the Ordinances of American Fork City. 
B. Course of Disposition Below 
On March 7, 2000, the defendant filed his motion to suppress all evidence 
subsequent to the arrest of the Defendant at his home on charges of obstructing justice. The 
Defendant was not charged with obstructing justice, but was charged with DUI. (R. at 5.) The 
court below held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and issued a ruling on June 14, 2000 
denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. at 78.) On January 24, 2001, the Defendant 
entered into a conditional plea agreement whereby the Defendant pleaded guilty/no contest to 
one count of driving while under the influence of alcohol as charged in the Information. (R. at 
112.) As a condition of the plea agreement, the Defendant was allowed to preserve his right of 
appeal in order to present his challenge to the admissibility of the evidence as outlined in his 
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motion to suppress. (R. at 112.) On August 8, 2001, the Defendant was sentenced by the 
Honorable Howard Maetani of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County and an order 
for a stay of execution pending appeal was issued. (R. 138-140.) The Defendant filed a notice 
of appeal August 2, 2001, thereby initiating this appeal. (R. at 142.) 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. On January 30, 2000, Officers Lisa Shelby and Keith Southard of the American Fork 
Police Department were called to assist the Lehi Police Department in investigating a custodial 
interference complaint. (Hr'g. on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 10-12.) 
2. The Lehi Police Department reported that two individuals, Gina Singleton and 
Defendant Larry Singleton, had taken the eighteen-month-old daughter of Jamie Boren and were 
driving from Lehi to American Fork. The report indicated that both individuals were intoxicated 
and provided a description of the truck they were driving. (Tr. at 10.) 
3. Officer Shelby located the truck that matched the description provided and followed 
the truck until it stopped at 403 West 300 South in American Fork. (Tr. at 10-11.) 
4. Defendant was driving the truck and Officer Shelby approached him and spoke with 
him. (Tr. at 12.) As she did so, she smelled the odor of alcohol on his person. (Tr. at 12.) 
Officer Shelby asked the Defendant if he had been drinking. He ignored the question and began 
to move toward the house, telling Gina Singleton to take the baby inside. (Tr. at 12.) 
5. Officer Southard spoke with the Defendant. Officer Southard observed the 
Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol coming from his breath; had glassy bloodshot eyes; and 
was swaying back and forth. (Tr. At 17). 
6. The Defendant, in response to Officer Southard's questions, stated that the 
Defendant had not "had a damn thing to drink." (Tr. At 17). 
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7. Defendant and Ms. Singleton insisted that everyone move into the house to get out of 
the cold. Everyone moved into the house, as requested. (Tr. at 13,18.) 
8. Officer Southard attempted to perform field sobriety tests on the Defendant. (Tr. at 
19-20.) 
9. The Defendant performed one test using the wrong finger to reach out and touch the 
officer's pen and had difficulty doing so. (Tr. at 19.) 
10. Defendant was belligerent and argumentative with Officer Southard, and refused to 
properly perform additional field sobriety tests. (Tr. at 19-20.) 
11. At this point, the Defendant attempted to leave and Officer Southard arrested him 
for DUI or obstructing justice. (Tr. at 25.) 
12. Defendant was transported to the police station where he performed field sobriety 
tests and blew a 0.249 on an intoxilyzer test. (Appellant's Brief at 12) It is this result that the 
Defendant sought to suppress in his motion to suppress evidence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The officer obtained sufficient 
information to know that the Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that was reported to contain 
two intoxicated individuals. Upon making contact with the Defendant, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of alcohol coming from the defendant's breath. The officer also observed that the 
Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and that his body swayed back and forth as the officer 
spoke to him. Additionally, although the officer was only able to perform a very limited number 
of field sobriety tests, the Defendant had trouble with the first one and became upset during the 
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administration of the second one, becoming uncooperative and belligerent. The Defendant also 
denied having had anything to drink. Under these circumstances, the facts known to the officer 
at the time of the arrest suggest that the officer could have reasonably believed that the crime of 
DUI was committed and that the Defendant committed it. Thus, the Defendant's arrest was 
proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof should not be suppressed. 
The Defendant asserts that whether probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI 
existed at the time of the arrest is irrelevant because the officer mistakenly announced that he 
was arresting the officer for obstructing justice. See Brief for Appellant at 6-9. However, 
whether the officer made this mistake does not taint the arrest because the officer had probable 
cause to arrest for DUI. While Utah has not addressed this issue, there are several jurisdictions 
that have, including the United States Supreme Court. The cases cited in the argument below 
establish that a mistaken pronouncement does not taint an arrest as long as there was probable 
cause to arrest at the time the arrest was made. This Court should follow these jurisdictions and 
uphold the lower court's determination that probable cause to arrest for DUI existed, thereby 
validating the arrest and the seizure of evidence obtained as a result thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The officer's arrest of the Defendant was proper because the officer had probable cause 
to believe that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to believe 
that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, in 
violation of section 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City, which is identical to Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6-44. This statute states in pertinent part: 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood 
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alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control 
of a vehicle within this state.... 
Regarding the arrest of the suspect, the ordinance further states that: 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
Id. Therefore, under the ordinance and statute, an officer may arrest an individual for DUI if he 
or she has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred and that the violation was 
committed by the individual. 
With regard to probable cause determinations, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that 
"probable cause is more than suspicion but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 
220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, "'In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name 
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, 
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." State v. Dorsev. 
731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Brieear v. United States. 338 U.S. 160,175, 
69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)) (alterations in original). More specifically, to determine whether 
the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for driving under the influence, in 
violation of the aforementioned statute, the test is "whether from the facts known to the officer, 
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." Lavton 
City v. Noon. 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing State v. Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259,1260 
(Utah 1972) (footnote omitted)). 
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In light of the standard articulated above, determining whether the officer had probable 
cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI is an imprecise determination of probability that must be 
made according to the totality of the facts and circumstances of each individual case. As the 
lower court found, the facts and circumstances of the matter at hand meet this standard and 
establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. This determination 
was correct and should not be overturned, as discussed below. 
In reviewing the lower court's determination that probable cause for arrest existed in the 
matter at hand, the Utah Court of Appeal's application of the aforementioned standard in Lavton 
City v. Noon. 736 P.2d at 1037-38, is instructive. In Noon, the Utah Court of Appeals applied 
the standard in upholding a finding of probable cause to arrest for DUI where an officer 
responded to a call from a convenience store clerk reporting that an intoxicated customer was 
about to become an intoxicated driver. See id. at 1037. Upon arriving at the store, the officer 
observed only a single automobile in the parking lot. See id. at 1038. The officer then 
confirmed the identity of the individual reported with the store clerk, as well as the fact that the 
individual had driven the vehicle observed in the parking lot. See id. Moreover, the officer 
could smell alcohol on the defendant's breath, heard the defendant's slurred speech, and 
observed the defendant's unsteady walk. The defendant also performed the field sobriety tests 
poorly. See id. Given these facts, the court concluded that the officer reasonably believed "that 
[the defendant] was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of 
driving a vehicle, and (2) that [the defendant] had been intoxicated while driving the parked 
vehicle." Id. (alteration in original). 
Contrary to the assertion made by the Defendant in his appellate brief, as applied to the 
matter at hand, the application of the probable cause standard articulated above yields a similar 
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result to that in Noon because the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the 
arrest suggest that the officer reasonably believed the offense of DUI had been committed and 
that the Defendant committed it. See Brief of Appellant at 12. More particularly, the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer at the time he arrested the Defendant, giving rise to probable 
cause, include the officer's knowing from the dispatch report that the driver and passenger of 
the vehicle were intoxicated. (Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 16-17.) Once the officer 
responded to the backup request from the other officer who first located the vehicle, the arresting 
officer positively identified the driver of the vehicle. The officer requesting assistance told the 
arresting officer that the Defendant had been the driver of the vehicle, as did the Defendant's son 
and the Defendant himself. (Tr. at 13, 17.) From this information, there was no doubt that the 
defendant was the driver of the vehicle. 
Upon identifying the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle, the officer approached the 
Defendant and detected the odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's person. (Tr. at 17.) 
The officer observed that the Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and noticed that the 
Defendant's body swayed back and forth as the Defendant spoke to the officer. (Tr. at 17.) 
Additionally, as the officer began the field sobriety tests, he observed that the Defendant had a 
difficult time reaching out and touching the top of the officer's pen, which the Defendant did 
using the wrong finger. (Tr. at 19.) Similarly, as the officer moved the pen, the Defendant did 
not follow the pen with his eyes and became upset. (Tr. at 19.) The Defendant glared at the 
officer angrily as the officer moved the pen three or four times. The Defendant's demeanor 
became uncooperative and belligerent. (Tr. at 19.) All of these facts and circumstances were 
known to or observed by the officer prior to the time of the arrest and support a determination by 
the officer that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. 
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Furthermore, when the officer told the Defendant that he thought the Defendant had been 
drinking, the Defendant responded, "No you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to drink." 
(Supp Hr'g Tr. at 17.) In light of the strong odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath, 
the Defendant's statement was a false denial and false denials are often significant in probable 
cause determinations. See State v. Spureeon. 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It has 
been stated that "'[c]ourts and commentators generally agree that a defendant's false or evasive 
responses [to police questions] in conjunction with highly suspicious behavior may be used to 
determine the existence of probable cause.'" Id. (quoting State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant, his physical 
characteristics, his uncooperative and belligerent manner while the officer was conducting the 
field sobriety tests, and his inability to adequately perform the field sobriety test(s) the officer 
administered constitute "highly suspicious" behavior. This behavior suggests that the Defendant 
had been drinking and was intoxicated. Thus, the Defendant's denying having had anything to 
drink, coupled with this behavior and the officer's observations regarding the Defendant's 
physical appearance and inability to balance, support the lower court's finding of probable cause 
to arrest for DUI. Taken together, these factors support the lower court's finding that the officer 
had probable cause to believe that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol sufficient to 
render him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, and that the defendant had been in control of a 
vehicle while in this condition, thereby justifying the arrest. 
In contrast to the Defendant's argument on appeal, the Defendant's alcohol content later 
established by the intoxilyzer test was not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest 
for DUI. In his brief, the Defendant states that "[t]he only probable cause for effecting a valid 
arrest came as a result of field sobriety tests that were performed at the police station after the 
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original arrest had been affected." Brief for Appellant at 9. This statement is incorrect. The 
remainder of the field sobriety tests were not needed to establish probable cause to arrest. The 
officer had sufficient information including his own observations of the Defendant, the odor of 
alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath, his physical appearance, and his inability to control 
different parts of his body. Further tests were not needed to make the determination that the 
Defendant could not safely operate a vehicle, but had done so. 
Similarly, the intoxilyzer test results are not needed to find probable cause to arrest for 
DUI, nor would the intoxilyzer test result be necessary to convict, according to the language of 
the relevant statute. The language of the statute set forth above indicates that an individual must 
be at 0.08% OR incapable of safely operating an automobile in order to be found guilty of 
driving under the influence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended) (emphasis 
added). Thus, a determination of whether the individual could safely operate the vehicle would 
suffice. Without the intoxilyzer test result, there is enough evidence, as discussed above, for the 
officer to determine that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating an automobile, thereby 
resulting in not only probable cause to arrest, but a conviction, as well. However, a conviction is 
not at issue in this matter and a prima facie case of DUI need not be presented to support the 
arrest. It is noted that with the intoxilyzer test results, there is also significant evidence to show 
that the Defendant also violated the ordinance by operating the vehicle at a time when he was 
intoxicated over the legal limit. But, again, this test is not needed to establish probable cause to 
arrest. 
As explained above, the Defendant's arrest was proper because the officer had probable 
cause to arrest him for DUI. Since the Defendant's arrest was proper, any evidence seized 
subsequently or as a result thereof is not tainted and should not be suppressed. Again, this was 
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the finding of the lower court and it should be upheld. 
II. The fact that the arresting officer verbally announced that he was arresting the Defendant 
for an offense different than the one for which probable cause existed does not render the 
arrest invalid. 
The facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest support the 
determination of probable cause to arrest for DUI. In the matter at hand, the arresting officer's 
report which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit states that the officer announced that he 
was arresting the Defendant for obstructing justice. (Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 27-28.) 
However, the officer testified that before he arrested the Defendant, the officer told the 
Defendant that he was going to arrest the Defendant for DUI or obstructing justice. (Tr. at 19.) 
The Defendant argues that the officer told the Defendant he was under arrest for obstructing 
justice, there was no probable cause to do so, and, therefore, the arrest is improper. See Brief for 
Appellant at 6-9. While the Defendant was uncooperative and belligerent as the officer 
attempted to administer field sobriety tests to the Defendant, thereby hindering the officer's 
investigation, it is questionable as to whether the officer had probable cause for arresting the 
Defendant for obstructing justice. Rather, the officer had probable cause for arresting the 
Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol, as discussed above. The fact that the 
officer verbally articulated the wrong offense does not invalidate the arrest and does not taint any 
evidence seized as a result of the arrest. 
Whether the mistaken pronouncement of the offense arrested for invalidates the arrest 
where probable cause existed for another, not verbally articulated, offense, is a central issue in 
the matter to be decided, as identified by the lower court at the evidentiary hearing on the 
Defendant's motion to suppress. The lower court stated, 
-11-
I think the issue . . . coming from this is going to be on whether the mistaken 
pronouncement taints the whole thing or not I'll tell you right now, if there's no case 
law that says that mistaken pronouncement does not taint everything, obviously then the 
Court will deny the Motion to Suppress. That's where it's at. So that's what I think it all 
comes down to. 
(Tr. at 46-47.) The lower court gave the Defendant fifteen days from the date of the suppression 
hearing to find authority that indicates that the arrest would be tainted by an incorrect 
pronouncement. (Tr. at 46-47.) The Defendant produced Columbus v. Holmes, 159 N.E.2d 232 
(Ohio 1959), but this case does not stand for the proposition that a mistaken pronouncement by 
an officer taints the arrest. See id. In response, the lower court denied the Defendant's motion 
to suppress, ruling that the intoxilyzer test results were admissible. (R. at 78.) 
Until the case at bar, Utah courts have not addressed the situation where an officer 
announces an arrest for a certain offense, one for which there is not probable cause, but where 
there is probable cause to arrest for a different, not verbally articulated, offense. Without Utah 
precedent, the Court should look to a number of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue 
and found that where the officer gives the wrong reasons for the arrest, but has probable cause to 
arrest for a different offense, the arrest is not rendered invalid. In other words, the arrest is legal 
and proper as supported by the probable cause, notwithstanding the fact that a different offense 
is incorrectly verbally cited at the time of arrest. See People v. Corrigan, 473 N.E. 2d 140 (111. 
Ct. App. 1985); Hatcher v. State. 410 N.E. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980); State v. Luna. 606 P.2d 
183, 187-88 (N.M. 1980) ("the arrest is not invalidated because the officer gave the wrong 
reasons for the arrest"); State v. Weiland. 695 P.2d 85, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) ("It matters not 
that the officers articulated the wrong reason for the arrest; the arrest was lawful."); State v. 
Huff. 826 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("an arrest supported by probable cause is not 
made unlawful by an officer's subjective reliance on, or verbal announcement of, an offense 
-12-
different from the one for which probable cause exists"); City of Seattle v. Cadigan. 776 P.2d 
727, 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
Even the United States Supreme Court has alluded to this principle in Florida v. Rover, 
460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed.2d 229 (1983). In Rover, the defendant challenged his 
detention at the airport and a subsequent search. The State argued that the defendant was not 
illegally detained and that the search was proper because the defendant gave his consent to the 
search. The Court responded and stated, 
Detective Johnson testified at the suppression hearing and the Flordia District Court 
of Appeal held that there was no probable cause to arrest until Royer's bags were 
opened, but the fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and 
proceeded on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State 
from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause and hence removing any 
barrier to relying on Royer's consent to search. 
Id. at 1329 (citing Peters v. New York, decided with Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 
S. Ct. 1889, 1904-5, 20 L. Ed.2d 917 (1968)). Therefore, in Rover, the State could have 
attempted to justify a detention after-the-fact if probable cause to arrest actually existed, 
regardless of whether the officers involved were aware that probable cause existed at that time. 
This rule should apply to the matter at hand. 
As applied to the case at bar, it does not matter whether the officer pronounced the 
correct offense at the time of making the arrest. There simply had to be probable cause for arrest 
at that time. The possibility of the officer's subjective belief that there was not probable cause to 
arrest for a different offense is also irrelevant. Essentially, Rover and the other cases cited above 
stand for the proposition that the justification of the arrest is properly made after-the-fact 
according to legal principles applied to the facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. This 
was the decision of the lower court in the matter at hand and it should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The facts and circumstances of the matter at hand indicate that the Defendant's arrest was 
proper because the officer had probable cause to believe that the crime of DUI had been 
committed and that the Defendant had committed it. Again, the officer smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath and observed the Defendant's bloodshot, glassy 
eyes. The officer also observed the Defendant's body sway back and forth as he spoke with the 
officer. When trying to administer the field sobriety tests to the Defendant, the Defendant 
struggled with the first one and became uncooperative and belligerent during the second. The 
Defendant also adamantly denied having had anything to drink. Under these circumstances, the 
officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Any pronouncement of any other 
offense at the time of the arrest is irrelevant to the propriety of the arrest itself. Therefore, the 
Defendant's arrest was proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof was proper and should 
not be suppressed. Such was the determination by the lower court and it should be upheld at this 
time. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ # ^ day of March, 2002. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
/ i T ^ E S / f UCKER" HANSEN 
/ ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
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